紀錄

Mistakes of the First Twenty-five Years (A Condensed Version)

頭25年所犯的錯誤(濃縮版)

To quote Robert Benchley, "Having a dog teaches a boy fidelity, perseverance, and to turn around three times before lying down." Such are the shortcomings of experience. Nevertheless, it's a good idea to review past mistakes before committing new ones. So let's take a quick look at the last 25 years.

　　套用Robert Benchley的名言： “要一隻狗教小孩子忠誠、忍耐，並此能夠滾三圈再在地上躺好”，這就是經驗傳承的難處，不過不論如何，再犯下一錯誤之前，最好能夠先反省一下以前的那些錯誤，所以讓我們花點時間回顧一下過去25年的經驗。

My first mistake, of course, was in buying control of Berkshire. Though I knew its business - textile manufacturing - to be unpromising, I was enticed to buy because the price looked cheap. Stock purchases of that kind had proved reasonably rewarding in my early years, though by the time Berkshire came along in 1965 I was becoming aware that the strategy was not ideal.

　首先我所犯的第一個錯誤，當然就是買下伯克希爾紡織的控制權，雖然我很清楚紡織這個產業沒什么前景，卻因為它的價格實在很便宜而受其所引誘，雖然在早期投資這樣的股票確實讓我獲利頗豐，但在1965年投資伯克希爾後，我就開始發現這終究不是個理想的投資模式。

If you buy a stock at a sufficiently low price, there will usually be some hiccup in the fortunes of the business that gives you a chance to unload at a decent profit, even though the long-term performance of the business may be terrible. I call this the "cigar butt" approach to investing. A cigar butt found on the street that has only one puff left in it may not offer much of a smoke, but the "bargain purchase" will make that puff all profit.

　　如果你以很低的價格買進一家公司的股票，應該很容易有機會以不錯的獲利出脫了結，雖然長期而言這家公司的經營結果可能很糟糕，我將這種投資方法稱之為 “煙屁股”投資法，在路邊隨地可見的香煙頭撿起來可能讓你吸一口，解一解煙癮，但對於隱君子來說，也不過是舉手之勞而已。

Unless you are a liquidator, that kind of approach to buying businesses is foolish. First, the original "bargain" price probably will not turn out to be such a steal after all. In a difficult business, no sooner is one problem solved than another surfaces - never is there just one cockroach in the kitchen. Second, any initial advantage you secure will be quickly eroded by the low return that the business earns. For example, if you buy a business for $8 million that can be sold or liquidated for $10 million and promptly take either course, you can realize a high return. But the investment will disappoint if the business is sold for $10 million in ten years and in the interim has annually earned and distributed only a few percent on cost. Time is the friend of the wonderful business, the enemy of the mediocre.

　不過除非你是清算專家，否則買下這類公司實在是屬於傻瓜行徑，第一長期而言，原來看起來划算的價格到最後可能一點都不值得，在經營艱困的企業中，通常一個問題才剛解決不久，另外一個問題就又接踵而來，廚房裏的蟑螂絕對不會只有你看到的那一隻而已，第二先前的價差優勢很快地就會被企業不佳的績效所侵蝕，例如你用800萬美元買下一家清算價值達1,000萬美元的公司，若你能馬上把這家公司給處理掉，不管是出售或是清算都好，換算下來你的報酬可能會很可觀，但是若這家公司要花上你十年的時間才有辦法把它給處理掉，而在這之前你只能拿回一點點可憐的股利的話，相信我時間雖然是好公司的朋友，但卻是爛公司最大的敵人。

You might think this principle is obvious, but I had to learn it the hard way - in fact, I had to learn it several times over. Shortly after purchasing Berkshire, I acquired a Baltimore department store, Hochschild Kohn, buying through a company called Diversified Retailing that later merged with Berkshire. I bought at a substantial discount from book value, the people were first-class, and the deal included some extras - unrecorded real estate values and a significant LIFO inventory cushion. How could I miss? So-o-o - three years later I was lucky to sell the business for about what I had paid. After ending our corporate marriage to Hochschild Kohn, I had memories like those of the husband in the country song, "My Wife Ran Away With My Best Friend and I Still Miss Him a Lot."

　　或許你會認為這道理再簡單不過了，不過我卻必須經歷慘痛的教訓才真正的搞懂，在買下伯克希爾不久之後，我又買了巴爾的摩百貨公司、HochschildKohn與一家叫多元零售公司(後來與伯克希爾合併)，我以相當的折價幅度買下這些公司，經營的人也屬一流，整個交易甚至還有額外的利益，包含未實現的房地產增值利益與後進先出法的存貨會計原則，我到底還漏掉了什么? 還好三年之後，算我走狗運，能夠以成本價左右的價格脫身，在跟HochschildKohn公司結束關係之後，我只有一個感想，就像一首鄉村歌曲的歌詞所述的， “我的老婆跟我最要好的朋友跑了，我是多么地懷念他!”

I could give you other personal examples of "bargain-purchase" folly but I'm sure you get the picture: It's far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price. Charlie understood this early; I was a slow learner. But now, when buying companies or common stocks, we look for first-class businesses accompanied by first-class managements.

　　我可以給各位另外一個個人經驗，以合理的價格買下一家好公司要比用便宜的價格買下一家普通的公司來的好的多，像查理老早就明白這個道理，我的反應則比較慢，不過現在當我們投資公司或股票時，我們不但選擇最好的公司，同時這些公司還要有好的經理人。

That leads right into a related lesson: Good jockeys will do well on good horses, but not on broken-down nags. Both Berkshire's textile business and Hochschild, Kohn had able and honest people running them. The same managers employed in a business with good economic characteristics would have achieved fine records. But they were never going to make any progress while running in quicksand. I've said many times that when a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact. I just wish I hadn't been so energetic in creating examples. My behavior has matched that admitted by Mae West: "I was Snow White, but I drifted."

從這裏我們又學到了一課，好的馬還要搭配好騎師才能有好成績，像伯克希爾紡織與Hochschild, Kohn也都有才能兼具的人在管理，很不幸的他們所面臨的是流沙般的困境，若能將這些人擺在體質更好的公司相信他們應該會有更好的成績。我曾說過好幾次，當一個績效卓著的經理人遇到一家惡名昭彰的企業，通常會是後者占上風，但願我再也沒有那么多精力來創造新的例子，我以前的行為就像是Mae West曾說的︰ “曾經我是個白雪公主，不過如今我已不再清白。”

A further related lesson: Easy does it. After 25 years of buying and supervising a great variety of businesses, Charlie and I have not learned how to solve difficult business problems. What we have learned is to avoid them. To the extent we have been successful, it is because we concentrated on identifying one-foot hurdles that we could step over rather than because we acquired any ability to clear seven-footers.

　另外還學到一個教訓，在經歷25年企業管理與經營各種不同事業的歲月之後，查理跟我還是沒能學會如此去解決難題，不過我們倒學會如何去避免他們，在這點我們倒做的相當成功，我們專挑那種一呎的低欄，而避免碰到七呎的跳高。

The finding may seem unfair, but in both business and investments it is usually far more profitable to simply stick with the easy and obvious than it is to resolve the difficult. On occasion, tough problems must be tackled as was the case when we started our Sunday paper in Buffalo. In other instances, a great investment opportunity occurs when a marvelous business encounters a one-time huge, but solvable, problem as was the case many years back at both American Express and GEICO. Overall, however, we've done better by avoiding dragons than by slaying them.

　這項發現看起來似乎是不太公平，不管是在經營企業或是投資通長堅持在容易又明顯的好公司會比死守在有問題的公司要來的好，當然有時困難的問題也有被解決的機會，像是我們剛開始在經營水牛城報紙一樣，或是有時一家好公司也會有暫時的難關，像是以前美國運通與GEICO都曾經一度發生狀況，不過總的來說，我們儘量做到回避妖龍，而不是冒險去屠龍。

My most surprising discovery: the overwhelming importance in business of an unseen force that we might call "the institutional imperative." In business school, I was given no hint of the imperative's existence and I did not intuitively understand it when I entered the business world. I thought then that decent, intelligent, and experienced managers would automatically make rational business decisions. But I learned over time that isn't so. Instead, rationality frequently wilts when the institutional imperative comes into play.

　我最意外的發現是企業一種看不到的巨大影響力，我們稱之為"系統規範"，在學校時沒有人告訴我這種規範的存在，而我也不是一開始進入商業世界就知道有這回事，我以為任何正當、聰明有經驗的經理人都會很自動的做這樣的決策，但慢慢地我發現完全就不是這么一回事，相反的理性的態度在系統規範的影響下都會慢慢地變質。

For example:

(1) As if governed by Newton's First Law of Motion, an institution will resist any change in its current direction;

(2) Just as work expands to fill available time, corporate projects or acquisitions will materialize to soak up available funds;

(3) Any business craving of the leader, however foolish, will be quickly supported by detailed rate-of-return and strategic studies prepared by his troops; and

(4) The behavior of peer companies, whether they are expanding, acquiring, setting executive compensation or whatever, will be mindlessly imitated.

舉例來說

(1)就好象是受牛頓第一運動定律所規範，任何一個組織機構都會抵抗對現有方向做任何的改變

(2)就像擁有會有工作來填滿所有的時間，企業的計畫或購並案永遠有足夠的理由將資金耗盡

(3)任何一個崇拜領導者的組織，不管有多離譜，他的追隨者永遠可以找到可以支援其理論的投資評估分析報告

(4)同業的舉動，不管是做擴張、購並或是訂定經理人待遇等都會在無意間彼此模仿。

Institutional dynamics, not venality or stupidity, set businesses on these courses, which are too often misguided. After making some expensive mistakes because I ignored the power of the imperative, I have tried to organize and manage Berkshire in ways that minimize its influence. Furthermore, Charlie and I have attempted to concentrate our investments in companies that appear alert to the problem.

　　是組織的動力而非腐敗或愚蠢，誤導他們走上這些路子，也因為我忽略了這種規律的力量，使我為這些所犯的錯誤付出高昂的代價，之後我便試圖組織管理伯克希爾儘量讓這種規律降低其影響程度，同時查理跟我也試著將我們的投資集中在對於這種問題有相當警覺的公司之上。

After some other mistakes, I learned to go into business only with people whom I like, trust, and admire. As I noted before, this policy of itself will not ensure success: A second-class textile or department-store company won't prosper simply because its managers are men that you would be pleased to see your daughter marry. However, an owner - or investor - can accomplish wonders if he manages to associate himself with such people in businesses that possess decent economic characteristics. Conversely, we do not wish to join with managers who lack admirable qualities, no matter how attractive the prospects of their business. We've never succeeded in making a good deal with a bad person.

再犯下其他幾個錯誤之後，我試著儘量只與我們所欣賞喜愛與信任的人往來，就像是我之前曾提到的，這種原則本身不會保證你一定成功，二流的紡織工廠或是百貨公司不會只因為管理人員是那種你會想把女兒嫁給他的人就會成功的，然而公司的老闆或是投資人卻可以因為與那些真正具有商業頭腦的人打交道而獲益良多，相反地我們不會希望跟那些不具令人尊敬的特質為伍，不管他的公司有多吸引人都一樣，我們永遠不會靠著與壞人打交道而成功。

Some of my worst mistakes were not publicly visible. These were stock and business purchases whose virtues I understood and yet didn't make. It's no sin to miss a great opportunity outside one's area of competence. But I have passed on a couple of really big purchases that were served up to me on a platter and that I was fully capable of understanding. For Berkshire's shareholders, myself included, the cost of this thumb-sucking has been huge.

其實有些更嚴重的錯誤大家根本就看不到，那是一些明明我很熟悉瞭解的股票或公司，但卻因故沒有能完成投資，錯失一些能力之外的大好機會當然沒有罪，但是我卻白白錯過一些自動送上門，應該把握卻沒有好好把握的好買賣，對於伯克希爾的股東，當然包括我自己本身在內，這種損失是難以估計的。

Our consistently-conservative financial policies may appear to have been a mistake, but in my view were not. In retrospect, it is clear that significantly higher, though still conventional, leverage ratios at Berkshire would have produced considerably better returns on equity than the 23.8% we have actually averaged. Even in 1965, perhaps we could have judged there to be a 99% probability that higher leverage would lead to nothing but good. Correspondingly, we might have seen only a 1% chance that some shock factor, external or internal, would cause a conventional debt ratio to produce a result falling somewhere between temporary anguish and default.

另外我們一貫保守財務政策可能也是一種錯誤，不過就我個人的看法卻不認為如此，回想起來，很明顯的我們只要能夠再多用一點財務杠杆操作(雖然較之他人還是很保守)，就可以得到遠比現在每年平均23.8%還要高的投資報酬率，即使是在1965年我們也可以百分之九十九地確定高一點的財務杠杆絕對只有好處沒有壞處，但同時我們可能也會有百分之一的機會，不管是從內部或是外部所引發令人異想不到的因素，使得我們負債比率提高到介於一時沖高到負債倒閉之間。

We wouldn't have liked those 99:1 odds - and never will. A small chance of distress or disgrace cannot, in our view, be offset by a large chance of extra returns. If your actions are sensible, you are certain to get good results; in most such cases, leverage just moves things along faster. Charlie and I have never been in a big hurry: We enjoy the process far more than the proceeds - though we have learned to live with those also.

我們一點都不會想要有那種99比1的可能性，以後也不會，一點挫敗或是侮辱小小的可能性永遠沒有辦法可以用很有可能大撈一筆的大好機會來彌補，只要你的行為合理，你就一定能夠得到好的結果，在大部分的狀況下，融資杠杆頂多只會讓你移動的更快，查理跟我從來都不會著急，我們享受過程更甚於結果，雖然我們也必須學會去承擔後者。

We hope in another 25 years to report on the mistakes of the first 50. If we are around in 2015 to do that, you can count on this section occupying many more pages than it does here.

我們希望25年後還能向各位報告伯克希爾頭50年所犯的錯誤，我想西元2015年的年報，大家應該可以確定這一部份將佔據更多的版面。